Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals - Published Opinions

Tuesday, January 08, 2019

Campbell: Officer Unlawfully Prolonged Traffic Stop but the Good Faith Exception Applied

In United States v. Campbell, No. 16-10128 (Jan. 8, 2019) (Tjoflat, Martin, Murphy (E.D. Mich.)), the Court affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress.

The Court first concluded that the highway patrolman had reasonable suspicion to stop a motorist based on a rapidly blinking turn signal.  The Court relied on Georgia law, which not only required that the turn signal clearly indicate an intention to change lanes but that it be in good working condition.  Because a rapdily blinking signal indicated that something was not in good working condition, it gave the officer reasonable suspicion to believe that the car was in violation of the traffic code.

However, the Court found that the officer unlawfully prolonged the stop by asking questions unrelated to the stop.  Relying on the Supreme Court's 2015 decision in Rodriguez v. United States, the Court found that an officer unlawfully prolongs a stop where, without reasonable suspicion, he diverts from the stop's purpose and adds time to the stop in order to investigate other crimes.   That standard, the Court found, abrogated the Eleventh Circuit's earlier precedents, which had employed a general reasonableness standard.  Applying the correct standard, the Court concluded that the officer in this case unlawfully prolonged the stop -- not by asking about the driver's travel plans (which was related to the reason for the stop), but by asking whether he had contraband in the car, which added 25 seconds to the stop.

The Court nonetheless affirmed by applying the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, because the officer's conduct was permissible under Eleventh Circuit precedent at the time of the stop.  Although the government did not raise the good faith exception on appeal, the parties addressed the issue in the district court, waiver was a prudential doctrine, and ignoring the exception here would be a miscarriage of justice by suppressing the truth for no reason other than to teach the government's counsel a lesson.

Judge Martin concurred in part and dissented in part, disagreeing with the majority's decision to apply the good faith exception despite the government's failure to raise it.  She would "not put this Court in the business of resusciating arguments the government was made aware of, then clearly abandoned.  In my experience, this Court rarely extends the same courtesy to the criminal defendants and pro se litigants who come before us."

Solomon: Successive 2255 Challenging 924(c) Conviction Based on Johnson Fails to Satisfy Gatekeeping Criteria

In Solomon v. United States, No. 17-14830 (Jan. 8, 2019) (William Pryor, Grant, Hull) (per curiam), the Court affirmed the denial of a successive 2255 motion to vacate a 924(c) conviction in light of Johnson.

The Court held that, in light of its en banc decision in Ovalles II and its subsequent decision in In re Garrett, the successive 2255 motion did not satisfy the gatekeeping requirements of 2255(h).  Because neither Johnson nor Dimaya invalidated the residual clause in 924(c)(3)(B), there was no rule of constitutional law supporting the claim.  Moreover, any challenge to the district court's use of the categorical approach (as opposed to a fact-based approach) would also not satisfy 2255(h), because that claim would be statutory rather than constitutional in nature.

Thursday, December 06, 2018

Barton: Rejecting Daubert Challenge to Expert Methodology for DNA Testing

In United States v. Barton, No. 17-10559 (Dec. 6, 2018) (Marcus, Newsom, Anderson), the Court affirmed the defendant's felon in possession conviction.

The sole issue on appeal was whether the district court abused its discretion under Daubert by admitting expert testimony concerning DNA evidence.  Focusing on the deferential standard of review, the Court rejected the defendant's arguments that the expert's methodology was unreliable because of the low quantity DNA mixture present and the absence of appropriate validation testing and interpretive thresholds for complex mixtures.  The Court found that the defendant's arguments went to weight rather than admissibility.  And, although the defendant identified newly-available scientific journals that bore on the reliability of the expert's methodology, the Court declined to consider them, because they were not included in the district court and were not a part of the record on appeal.  Where newly-discovered evidence undermines the validity of the conviction, the defendant may seek a new trial in the district court; but an appellate court may not consider that evidence for the first time on appeal and make factual findings.  Finally, the court held that the admission of the DNA evidence was harmless in any event because the other evidence of guilt was overwhelming.

Friday, November 16, 2018

St. Hubert: Hobbs Act Robbery and Attempted Hobbs Act Robbery are Crimes of Violence Under Both Clauses in 924(c)

In United States v. St.Hubert, No. 16-10874 (Nov. 15, 2018) (Hull, Marcus, Anderson), the Court sua sponte modified its earlier opinion in part and applied the recent en banc decision in Ovalles.

The Court reinstated without change its earlier analysis rejecting the government's argument that the defendant's guilty plea waived his argument that his convictions were not crimes of violence.  It also reinstated without change its holding that Hobbs Act robbery qualified as a crime of violence under the elements clause in 924(c)(3)(A). 

Applying Ovalles' conduct-based approach, the Court held that the defendant's Hobbs Act robbery conviction satisfied the residual clause in 924(c)(3)(B).  Reviewing the facts admitted at the plea hearing -- namely, brandishing a firearm and threatening to shoot store employees during a robbery -- the Court concluded that his offense involved a substantial risk that physical force may have been used against a person or property.

The Court also held that the defendant's attempted Hobbs Act robbery conviction was a crime of violence under both the elements clause and residual clause in 924(c).  As to the residual clause, the Court again reviewed the facts admitted at the plea hearing -- which involved brandishing a firearm, holding it against one employee's side while directing another to open the safe, but fleeing before he could take any money -- and concluded that this conduct involved a substantial risk that physical force might be used against a person or property.  Alternatively, the Court reiterated and slightly modified its holding that attempted Hobbs Act robbery satisfied the elements clause because it necessarily involves the attempted use of force or threatened force.

Friday, November 02, 2018

In re Garrett: Johnson and Dimaya Do Not Authorize Successive 2255 Motions in 924(c) Cases

In In reGarrett, No. 18-1380 (Nov. 2, 2018) (Wiliam Pryor, Hul, Julie Carnes), the Court denied an application for authorization to file a second or successive 2255 motion based on Johnson and Dimaya.

Given the en banc Court's decision in Ovalles that 924(c)(3)(B) is not unconstitutionally vague after Dimaya, the Court held that the applicant failed to satisfy the gatekeeping crtieria in 2255(h), because there was no new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive by the Supreme Court, that applied to his claim.  The Court made clear that its ruling would apply to all second or successive applications involving a 924(c) claim based on Johnson and Dimaya.

Friday, October 26, 2018

Hernandez: Rules of Evidence Inapplicable in 851 Proceeding

In United States v. Hernandez, No. 17-15666 (Oct. 26, 2018) (Wilson, William Pryor, Anderson), the Court affirmed the defendant's 240-month mandatory minimum drug-related sentence under 21 U.S.C. 841(b).

First, the Court rejected the defendant's argument that the Rule of Evidence applied in an 851 proceeding to determine whether the defendant has a prior conviction triggering the mandatory  minimum.  Rather, that proceeding was a miscellaneous proceeding akin to a sentencing hearing, in which the Rules did not necessarily apply.  As a result, it is up to the district court whether to apply the Rules or instead to determine whether the evidence satisfies a "sufficient indicia of reliability" standard, which the evidence in this case did.

Second, the Court concluded that the district court committed plain error by employing a preponderance standard instead of the reasonable-doubt standard in the 851 proceeding.  However, the Court found that this error did not affect the defendant's substantial rights, because the evidence satisfied the reasonable-doubt standard.

Thursday, October 25, 2018

Jones: Florida Second-Degree Murder is a Violent Felony under the ACCA's Elements Clause

In United States v. Jones, No. 17-12240 (Oct. 25, 2018) (Marcus, Tjoflat, Newsom), the Court held that Florida second-degree murder is a violent felony under the elements clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act.

The Court rejected the defendant's primary argument that the use of poison did not constitute the use of physical force.  Prior circuit precedent had rejected that exact argument in the context of Florida first-degree murder.  And the only difference between first and second degree murder pertained to the mental state, which the Court found made no difference to the elements-clause analysis. 

Carthen: Rule 608(b) Prohibits Impeachment by Contradiction, and Mandatory 924(c) Sentences Do not Violate Eighth Amendment

In United States v. Carthen, No. 16-17653 (Oct. 25, 2018) (Martin, William Pryor, Baldock), the Court affirmed the defendants' robbery and firearms convictions and sentences over multiple challenges.

First, the Court found sufficient evidence that one of the defendants conspired to commit a robbery and voluntarily participated in the robbery with a firearm.

Second, the Court found no plain error in admitting statements by the defendants' co-conspirator under the hearsay exception in 801(d)(2)(E).  The Court ruled that, when determining whether a conspiracy existed and whether the statement was made during the course of it, the court may rely on information provided by the co-conspirator as well as independent external evidence.  The Court found enough evidence of a conspiracy to satisfy the exception.

Third, the Court found no abuse of discretion under Rule 608(b) by excluding the testimony of two defense witnesses designed to show that the co-conspirator had lied in other judicial proceedings.  The Court reasoned that the Rule prohibited that evidence because it was designed only to make a general showing that the witness had a dishonest character.

Fourth, the Court held that the 924(c) sentencing scheme, resulting in a mandatory 57-term for the defendants here, did not violate the Eighth Amendment.  Although that sentence was 5-6 times what the guideline range would have been, the Court had upheld a mandatory sentence of 182 years in a prior 924(c) case, which was over 10 times the guideline range.  Because the defendant could not distinguish that prior case, the Court found that he failed to make a threshold showing of disproportionality.

Judge William Pryor concurred in full, but wrote separately to opine that the Court's Rule 608(b) precedents categorically prohibiting impeachment by contradiction were contrary to the current version of the Rule and the position taken by the majority of the other circuits.  He argued that, in an appropriate case where the issue was presented, the Court should hold that those precedents had been abrogated by the 2003 amendment to the Rule.

Friday, October 19, 2018

Garcia: Plainly Unconstitutional Resumption of Trial Absent Defense Counsel and Defendant Did not Require Reversal

In United States v. Garcia, No. 14-11845 (Oct. 19, 2018) (Marcus, Wilson, Graham (S.D. Ohio)), the Court affirmed the defendant's tax-related convictions.

The primary issue was whether reversal was required because the district judge resumed trial without the presence of either the defendant or defense counsel for 3 to 10 minutes, during which time the government introduced inculpatory testimony.  The parties agreed that this was obviously constitutional error, and, although the Court found it troubling, the Court held that the error did not warrant reversal because the defendant could not show prejudice.  Bound by the en banc decision in Roy, the Court determined that this was trial error, rather than structural error, and it therefore could not presume prejudice.  The Court also found that the plain error, rather than the harmless error, standard of review applied, because the defendant had numerous opportunities to contemporaneously object to the error and failed to do so.  And, while the result might have been different had the government bore the burden to show harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court concluded that the defendant could not meet her burden show that the plain error affected her substantial rights in light of: the cumulative nature and brevity of the missed testimony, its irrelevance to the most hotly contested issued at trial, the strength of the government's case, and robust cross examination by the defense.

The Court rejected the defendant's remaining arguments, all of which were unpreserved as well.  First, it found that the indictment included all of the elements of a Klein conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. 371, and it was therefore legally sufficient on that count.  Second, although the court committed plain error by instructing the jury on an attempt theory that was not charged, that error did not affect her substantial rights because it was unlikely that the jury convicted her on such a theory.  Third, the defendant could not show that any erroneous instruction on the Klein conspiracy affected her substantial rights, especially given that the jury convicted her on the underlying substantive counts.  Fourth, the defendant invited the district court's failure to give a multiple objects/unanamity instruction for the conspiracy charge.  Fifth, the court properly instructed the jury on the "material" element of the substantive tax counts.  And, lastly, the court properly instructed the jury on "aiding and abetting," observing that the Supreme Court's decision in Rosemond clarified rather than changed the law on that point and did not render the pattern instruction incorrect.

Judge Wilson concurred.  He reiterated his dissenting view in Roy that the error here should be deemed structural, which would have precluded (rather than encouraged) the district judge from continuing his unconstitutional courtroom policies, but he recognized that Roy foreclosed that conclusion.  He disagreed with the majority, however, that plain error rather than harmless error review applied.  He nonetheless concluded that the government had met its burden to show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.